Libya Isn’t Europe’s Crisis Anymore – But It Should Be

Introduction
Today, Libya is largely off the EU’s radar. Since after 7 October 2023, with war in Gaza and crises across the broader MENA region, the EU’s strategic lens has shifted eastward. But while attention wanes, Libya continues to fragment beneath the surface — a slow-burning crisis with immediate Euro-Mediterranean consequences. 

The latest clashes in Tripoli in May 2025 served as a sobering reminder: Libya’s unresolved divisions are not frozen — they are active, dangerous, and deteriorating. 

Main Content
My research, combining desk analysis and interviews with senior Libyan and European officials, looked at how the EU’s two flagship missions — EUBAM Libya and Operation IRINI — have performed in this context of declining visibility. The findings are clear: technical progress has not translated into strategic impact. 

EUBAM has delivered capacity-building in Tripoli, including targeted training in border management. But its reach remains geographically confined, blocked by political resistance in the east, where actors view it as an instrument of EU migration containment, not a neutral security partner. Operation IRINI has increased maritime surveillance — seizing illegal cargo and inspecting suspect vessels — but has not adapted to the real shift in arms flows now entering Libya through land and air routes, especially into eastern areas under Haftar’s control. 

This imbalance was confirmed by interviewees on both sides: a GNU official noted that “Libyans see the weapons arriving despite IRINI’s presence,” while a former EP Special Rapporteur warned that EU missions risk reinforcing divisions they were meant to overcome. 

Meanwhile, the broader political deadlock between the GNU and GNS continues, and UNSMIL’s recent report warns that the fragile equilibrium could easily collapse. Despite the work of an Advisory Committee proposing four electoral pathways, the dispute over a unified transitional government remains a central obstacle to elections — and to long-term stability. 

Key Insights
The EU has become reactive in Libya — monitoring symptoms, not addressing causes. Yet, its actions are not neutral: the exclusive engagement with western institutions and migration-focused programming has alienated key actors. A recalibration is urgently needed, especially as the 2025–2027 EU-Libya Cooperation Package and the New Pact for the Mediterranean are being shaped. 

One underexplored opportunity is re-engaging civil society actors across the divide — not just in Tripoli but also in Benghazi and Fezzan. While difficult, this is essential to rebuilding trust and ensuring Libyan ownership of the process. 

Conclusion & Call to Action
Libya is not just a humanitarian or migration issue. It is a strategic test of the EU’s credibility as a security and diplomatic actor in its own neighbourhood. The EU must: 

• Expand IRINI’s monitoring scope to land and air routes; 

• Diversify political engagement beyond Tripoli; 

• Align more closely with UNSMIL efforts; 

• Integrate Libya’s energy sector into a transparent, inclusive strategic plan. 

Above all, the EU must act now — before fragmentation becomes collapse. 

This research was developed as part of the Mediterranean Youth in Action programme, implemented by the Anna Lindh Foundation and co-funded by the EU.