Why the EU Needs to Rethink Its Fight Against Disinformation in the Southern Neighbourhood

Disinformation has become one of the defining challenges of our digital age. The European Union (EU) has taken it seriously by tightening regulation, banning Kremlin-backed media like RT and Sputnik, and building partnerships with tech companies and fact-checkers. These measures have strengthened Europe’s “democratic information space” and limited the reach of malicious actors inside the Union. 

But here’s the catch: what works in Brussels doesn’t necessarily work in Beirut, Amman, Tunis, or Cairo. When the EU exports its counter-disinformation toolkit to its Southern Neighbourhood (SN) it often hits three major blind spots: language, scope, and context. 

Language is the most immediate. EU measures overwhelmingly focus on English and other European languages, while Arabic, the primary language of the SN, is under-served by both platforms and policymakers. Automated moderation systems fail to grasp the complexity of Arabic dialects. Consequently, this results into two extremes: legitimate voices are wrongly silenced, or false narratives flourish unchecked. This digital imbalance makes the SN particularly vulnerable, especially as social media becomes the main source of news in societies where traditional media is restricted, co-opted, or distrusted. 

Scope is another challenge. EU countermeasures are designed with European audiences and institutions in mind. While these measures have merit within the bloc, exporting them “as is” overlooks the very different realities of the SN’s media environment. In many cases, disinformation is not just a matter of falsehoods being propagated, but of governments, political actors, and foreign powers actively weaponizing narratives to destabilize societies or advance their agendas. 

Finally, there is context. EU countermeasures are framed within a liberal-democratic spirit, often casting the fight against disinformation as synonymous with the fight for democracy. But in the SN, where authoritarian-adjacent practices are entrenched and democratic ideals carry less influence, such framing risks being ineffective or even counterproductive. Here, disinformation is entangled with repression, foreign influence, and the fragile public trust in institutions. 

To be clear, the EU has not stood idle. The now outdated Joint Communication on a Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood, the upcoming New Pact for the Mediterranean, and the work of Task Force South within the European External Action Service all recognize disinformation as part of broader digital resilience. Investments in digital skills, independent media, and youth engagement are positive steps. But they remain modest compared to the urgency and scale of the challenge. 

So what could be done differently? A few things stand out.

• Localized content moderation: An SN-oriented Code of Practice on Disinformation, adapted from Europe’s own model, could incentivize Arabic-language moderation and fact-checking. 

• Greater engagement in Arabic: Expanding the EU’s Arabic-language communication, especially through partnerships with popular content creators, would allow the EU to reach audiences where they actually are. 

• Support for independent media and fact-checkers: Sustainable funding and protections for journalists are crucial, particularly in repressive environments. 

• Technical collaboration on AI moderation: Developing shared Arabic-language glossaries and classifiers could help platforms more effectively monitor and contextualize content. 

At its core, tackling disinformation in the SN requires moving beyond one-size-fits-all solutions. The EU’s successes at home are real, but to be credible across the Euro-Mediterranean, its measures must be linguistically capable, locally grounded, and politically aware. 

This research was developed as part of the Mediterranean Youth in Action programme, implemented by ALF and co-funded by the EU.